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Abstract
We propose a new explanation for price rigidity. We show that if consumers form habits in
individual goods, then ﬁrms face a time-inconsistency problem. The consumers’ habits imply
that low prices in the future help attract customers in the present. Firms would therefore like to
promise low prices in the future. But when the future arrives they have an incentive to exploit
consumers’ habits and price gouge. In this model, unlike the standard no-habit model, nominal
price rigidity is an equilibrium outcome. Equilibrium price rigidity can be sustained because
rigid prices help ﬁrms overcome the time-inconsistency problem. If customers have incomplete
information about ﬁrms’ desired prices, the optimal policy for the ﬁrm is to commit to a “price
cap”. Our model therefore provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of a rigid
regular price and frequent sales, a pattern that is diﬃcult to reconcile with existing menu cost
models or price rigidity. Our model also explains survey evidence on ﬁrms’ fears of adverse
customer reactions to price changes, the fact that ﬁrms make open commitments to customers
not to change their prices, the tendency of price rigidity to increase with the frequency of repeat
purchases and the tendency of prices to be more rigid to existing customers than new customers.
Keywords: Time-inconsistency, Price Rigidity, Habit Formation, Asymmetric Information.
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A consumer’s past purchases of a particular product often exert a strong positive inﬂuence on his
current demand for this product. Such time non-separability of preferences arise for many diﬀerent
reasons. Some goods are addictive while consumers develop a sense of “brand-loyalty” to others.
Consumers favor some products that they have used in the past because of compatibility with other
equipment while they favor other products because the quality of competing products is unknown
to them. And consumers continue using some products simply because of the large transaction
costs associated with switching to a competitor (e.g., another bank or another internet service
provider).
For all these reasons, it is common for consumers to be partially locked into purchasing a
particular product once they have begun purchasing it. Similar lock-in eﬀects are common when
ﬁrms purchase from suppliers. Blinder et al. (1998) note that 85% of all goods and services in the
U.S. non-farm business sector are sold to ‘regular customers’ and that 70% of these are business-
to-business transactions. Shapiro and Varian (1999, ch. 5 and 6) present a detailed discussion of
the importance of lock-in in business-to-business transactions.
In this paper, we study the implications that this has for ﬁrm price setting. Following Ravn
et al. (2005), we formalize the time non-separability of consumer demand with a model of good-
speciﬁc habits. We interpret this good-speciﬁc habit as providing a reduced form speciﬁcation for
the eﬀects of the various types of switching costs described above as well as capturing the type
of addiction studied by Becker and Murphy (1988). We solve for the consumer’s demand curve
given these preferences and assuming rational expectations. We show that consumer demand is
forward-looking; consumer demand depends negatively not only of the current price of the product
but also of the consumer’s expectations about the good’s future prices.
The forward-looking nature of consumer demand implies that ﬁrms face a time-inconsistency
problem. Since consumers’ current demand depends negatively on expected future prices of the
product as well as its current price, ﬁrms would like to promise that they will keep their prices
low in the future. However, when the future arrives and consumers are locked in, the ﬁrms have
an incentive to renege on their earlier promises and price gouge. The consumers understand these
incentives and don’t take the ﬁrms’ promises at face value unless the ﬁrms are able to make
1credible commitments. We show that if ﬁrms are not able to make credible commitments this
time-inconsistency problem leads them to set prices that are sub-optimally high both from a proﬁt
perspective and from the perspective of overall welfare.
The model we analyze is a model of “customer markets”. The seminal paper on customer mar-
kets is Phelps and Winter (1970).1 An important drawback of the earlier literature on customer
markets is that customers’ demand curves are not derived from the behavior of forward-looking,
optimizing agents. We show that the conclusions of the customer markets literature change sub-
stantially once the forward-looking nature of customers is taken into account. Most importantly,
in the earlier literature, ﬁrms do not face a time-inconsistency problem.
Explaining price rigidity was a major motivation for the original development of customer
markets models. According to Okun’s (1981) “invisible handshake” version of the customer markets
idea, ﬁrms have implicit agreements with their customers not to take advantage of tight market
conditions by raising their price in exchange for stable prices in weak markets. This view of price
rigidity ﬁnds strong support in the views of ﬁrm managers. When managers of U.S. manufacturing
ﬁrms were asked why they don’t change their prices more often than they do, by far the most
frequent answer they gave was that they feared that this would “antagonize” their customers
(Blinder et al., 1998). Similar surveys in a host of other countries have since conﬁrmed that the
most important reason cited by ﬁrm managers for price rigidity is that they are loathe to “damage
customer relations” by changing their prices.2
The problem with this explanation for price rigidity has been that the customer markets lit-
erature has not provided a convincing rationale for why ﬁrms enter into these implicit contracts
with their customers. Our model suggests that the reason may be that ﬁrms are trying to build
and maintain a reputation for not taking advantage of locked-in customers. In other words, prices
may be rigid because ﬁrms are trying to “commit to a sticky price”. In section 4, we show that
ﬁrms beneﬁt from the ability to set rigid nominal prices since this partially alleviates their time-
1Other contributions include Okun (1981), Bils (1989), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1995) and Bagwell (2004).
2See Apel et al. (2004) for a survey of Swedish ﬁrms; Hall et al. (1997) for U.K. ﬁrms; Amirault et al. (2004) for
Canadian ﬁrms; and Fabiani et al. (2004) for a meta-study of surveys of ﬁrms in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,
Italy, Luxembough, the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal. A consistent ﬁnding across these surveys is that ﬁrms
rate implicit and explicit contracts as the most important (or, in a few cases, among the most important) sources of
price rigidity. In contrast, menu-costs and information costs typically rank rather low among the reasons for price
rigidity. Fabiani et al. (2004) is particularly noteworthy due to its size (over 10,000 respondents) and scope (nine
countries and many diﬀerent sectors).
2inconsistency problem. An equilibrium exists in our model in which ﬁrms commit to rigid nominal
prices. In this equilibrium, ﬁrms are induced not to deviate from otherwise time-inconsistent ac-
tions by the threat that a deviation would damage their reputation and trigger an adverse shift in
consumer expectations about future prices. In section 6, we present numerous quotes from ﬁrms’
marketing rhetoric in which they promise customers not to increase prices, sometimes with the
stated goal of not adversely aﬀecting consumers’ expectations about future prices.
The time-inconsistency problem that ﬁrms face implies that there is a fundamental diﬀerence
between our model and the more standard “no-habit” model. In the no-habit model, there is only
one equilibrium and that equilibrium does not entail nominal price rigidity. In our model, there are
many equilibrium price paths associated with reputational equilibria, all of which are preferred to
the discretionary equilibrium. Whether price rigidity arises thus becomes a question of equilibrium
selection, as in Hall (2005). One might argue that reputational equilibria are hard to achieve
since they require that customers understand the ﬁrm’s pricing rule. However, a commitment
to a constant price seems particularly simple for a ﬁrm to convey. Moreover, barriers to price
adjustment, such as menu costs, can help ﬁrms commit to price rigidity. Analogous mechanisms
that help ﬁrms make state-contingent commitments are less available.
In section 5, we consider an extension of our basic model in which variables that aﬀect the ﬁrm’s
pricing problem—such as its marginal costs and the demand for its products—are unobservable or
too costly for the ﬁrm’s customers to observe. In the standard no-habit model, this is irrelevant
since it is unnecessary for the consumer to understand the ﬁrm’s optimization problem. However,
in the habit model, asymmetric information limits the variables that it is possible, even in principle,
for the ﬁrm to make commitments contingent on. We use the results of Athey et al. (2004) to
show that the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy under this kind of asymmetric information is to commit
to a “price cap”. Under this policy, the ﬁrm acts with discretion when its desired price is low,
but when its desired price is high the ﬁrm sets its price equal to the price cap. The price cap
has the beneﬁcial eﬀect that it lowers the customers’ expectations about future prices and thereby
increases demand. Given plausible assumptions about the process followed by the desired price
and the extent of informational asymmetries, the ﬁrm’s price will be “stuck” at the price cap a
signiﬁcant fraction of the time. It will, however, frequently drop below the price cap and exhibit
much more ﬂexibility when it is not at the price cap.
3Our model therefore has the following empirical prediction: Goods prices should spend a signif-
icant portion of their time at a rigid upper bound. Below this upper bound, they should be much
more ﬂexible. As the reader is no doubt aware from casual observation, two of the most salient
features of retail price series are the existence of a “regular” price, which remains unchanged for
long periods of time, and frequent “sales”—i.e., brief periods during which the price drops below
its regular price before returning back to the old regular price.3 In section 6, we document these
features of retail prices formally using the Dominick’s Finer Foods dataset provided by the Univer-
sity of Chicago Graduate School of Business. We furthermore show that sales prices are about 8
times more ﬂexible than regular prices.
To date, price rigidity and the existence of frequent sales have been studied separately. On
the one hand, there is a large literature in macroeconomics about price rigidity. Theoretical work
seeking to understand price rigidity has focused on the notion that there may be costs associated
with changing prices.4 Several features of retail price data are however diﬃcult to reconcile with
existing models of menu costs. These include the incredible number of sales observed in retail price
data and the fact that prices frequently return to the old regular price after sales. However, the
combination of a price cap rule and menu costs that only apply to changes in the “regular price” is
consistent with the data. In a model without habit, a menu cost that does not apply to temporary
price changes yields the counterfactual prediction that “reverse sales” should occur as frequently
as sales.
On the other hand, there is a large literature in applied microeconomics and industrial organi-
zation documenting the existence of frequent sales and seeking to understand why they arise.5 An
important idea in this literature is that sales may be used to price discriminate. However, these
models cannot account for the existence of a rigid regular price that truncates the price distribution
from above. Our model is the only model of rational agents we are aware of that is consistent with
both rigid regular prices and frequent sales.6
3See ﬁgures 1-3 for examples of this pattern.
4Empirical studies of price rigidity include Carlton (1986), Cecchetti (1986), Kashyap (1995), Blinder et al. (1998),
Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2005). Contributions to the
literature on menu costs include Barro (1972), Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985), Caplin and Spulber (1987)
and Golosov and Lucas (2005).
5Contributions to the literature on sales include Salop (1977), Varian (1980), Salop and Stiglitz (1982), Conlisk
et al. (1984), Lazear (1986), Pashigian and Bowen (1991), Warner and Barsky (1995), Aguirregabiria (1999), Hosken
et al. (20000), Pesendorfer (2002), Chevalier et al. (2003) and Hendel and Nevo (2003).
6Rotemberg (2004) presents a model in which consumers become angry if they perceive ﬁrm pricing to be unfair.
4In section 6, we discuss a number of existing empirical results that support our model of price
rigidity. In particular, we discuss experimental evidence supporting the notion that prices are
stickier in customer markets. We also discuss empirical work showing that prices to new customers
are less rigid than prices to old customers.
We build heavily on recent work by Ravn et al. (2005). While the primary focus of their
paper is a model of good speciﬁc external habits, they also derive consumer demand in the case
of good speciﬁc internal habits. They note that in the internal habits model the ﬁrm faces a time
inconsistency problem but leave for future research a detailed analysis of the ﬁrm’s pricing problem
in this case. Our paper focuses on analyzing this problem.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we derive the demand curve for consumers that
form habits in individual goods. In section 3, we discuss the time-inconsistency problem faced by
ﬁrms and solve for the optimal pricing rule in the polar cases of fully state-contingent commitment
and complete discretion. In section 4, we show that ﬁrms beneﬁt from price rigidity and that price
rigidity is therefore an equilibrium outcome of our model. In section 5, we derive the optimal
pricing policy of the ﬁrm when it has private information about its desired price. In section 6, we
present empirical evidence supporting our model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Demand When Consumers Have Good Speciﬁc Internal Habits
Consider an economy in which there are a continuum of ﬁrms of measure one each of which produces















ct(z) denotes the consumption of good z at time t and θt is the consumers’ elasticity of demand at
time t. This utility function implies that consumers’ utility from the consumption of any particular
good is not only a function of their current consumption of that good. It also depends on their past
consumption of that good. In other words, the consumer has a habit in each of the diﬀerentiated
He shows how this model is consistent with both price rigidity and temporary sales.
5goods. The parameter γ ≥ 0 is a measure of the degree of this good-speciﬁc habit.7 For simplicity
we choose a speciﬁcation of utility in which the consumer’s elasticity of demand is only a function
of time. The time variation in the consumer’s elasticity of demand should be viewed as a stand-in
for all the time varying features of demand that aﬀect the ﬁrm’s optimal price and that are not
explicitly modeled.
Theoretical work on habit formation has largely focused on models in which consumers form
habits in their total level of consumption rather than forming a habit in a particular good. Constan-
tinides (1990) and Fuhrer (2000) consider a model in which consumers’ utility from consumption
depends on past values of their own consumption (internal habit). Abel (1990) and Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) instead study models in which consumers are “catching up with the Joneses”—i.e.,
their utility from consumption depends on past values of aggregate consumption (external habit).
The consequences of consumers forming habits in individual goods has until recently not received
much attention, to our knowledge. In a recent paper, Ravn et al. (2005) study the consequences
of external habit in speciﬁc goods for the cyclicality of markups. Ravn et al. (2005) also derive
consumer demand in the case of internal habit, but leave a detailed analysis of the ﬁrm’s pricing
problem in this case for future research. In contrast we focus on the case of good speciﬁc internal
habit. The only other paper we are aware of that considers good-speciﬁc internal habit is Becker
and Murphy’s (1988) model of rational addiction. While our model is formally a model of addictive
goods, we interpret it as also capturing in a reduced form way “switching costs” of the type discussed
in Klemperer (1995).
The consumers face two types of decisions about consumption. They must decide how much to
spend on consumption at each point in time and they must decide how to allocate their spending at
each point between the diﬀerent goods. These two problems may be analyzed separately. We focus
on the allocation of spending across goods at a particular point in time. Given a state contingent
path for total consumption {Ct+j}∞
j=0, the consumers seek to minimize their expenditures. Formally,
7By assuming that γ ≥ 0, we are focusing on goods for which a consumer’s past purchases exert a positive inﬂuence
on current demand. While this is true for many goods, there also exist goods for which a consumer’s purchases in
the recent past negatively inﬂuence current demand. This is true, e.g., for durable goods. For such goods, equations
(1) and (2) with γ < 0 may imply a reasonable reduced form model for consumer demand. To the extent that this is
the case, the results of our model hold for this class of goods as well as the class of goods we focus on. See footnotes
17 and 19 for a more detailed discussion of what our model implies in the γ < 0 case.









j=0, where Mt,t+j denotes the stochastic discount factor that the consumers use
to value future cash ﬂows.
The solution to this optimization problem implies that consumer demand for good z is








where Pt denotes the price level.8 Notice that when γ = 0 and θt is a constant, this demand
curve reduces to the iso-elastic Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve. When γ 6= 0, demand diﬀers from this
simple benchmark in two ways. First, demand at time t depends on last period’s demand. Second,
current demand is inﬂuenced not only by the current price but also by the consumer’s expectations
about the future price of the good. The intuition for these two eﬀects is straight-forward. When
the consumer has a habit, his utility depends directly on his consumption in the last period. His
demand today therefore depends on his consumption last period. However, the consumer also
understands that by consuming a particular good today he is increasing his habit in the good,
thereby increasing his future demand for it. As a consequence, the consumer’s demand today is
aﬀected by how costly it will be to feed his habit in the future, i.e., his demand will depend on his
expectations about the future price of the good.
3 Price Setting by Firms
For simplicity we adopt the setting of monopolistic competition. Since each ﬁrm faces a downward
sloping demand curve—equation (2)—it is able to set the price of the good it produces. Firms are




M0,t[pt(z)ct(z) − WtLt(z)], (3)
subject to the constraint that it produces at least as much as it sells,
ct(z) ≤ Atf(Lt(z)), (4)
8Pt is the index of individual prices that has the property that PtCt is the minimum expenditure required to
achieve a utility level Ct. Pt is also the Lagrange multiplier in the consumer’s constrained expenditure minimization
problem.
7and subject to the demand for its product, given by equation (2). Here At denotes an exogenous
technology factor, Lt(z) denotes the ﬁrm’s labor demand and Wt denotes the wage paid by the ﬁrm
to its employees.
An important consequence of consumers having good-speciﬁc internal habits is that the ﬁrm
faces a time-inconsistency problem when setting its price. Since consumer demand depends neg-
atively on expected future prices of the product as well as its current price, the ﬁrm would like
to be able to aﬀect the consumer’s expectations by promising a low price in the future. However,
when the future arrives, the ﬁrm has an incentive to renege on its earlier promise by charging a
high price. The consumers understand these incentives and don’t take the ﬁrm’s promises at face
value unless the ﬁrm is able to make a credible commitment. In this section, we focus on the two
polar cases: full commitment to a state-contingent rule and complete discretion. In sections 4 and
5 we explore some intermediate cases.
Solving analytically for optimal behavior under discretion is diﬃcult since the constraints im-
posed on the ﬁrm’s optimization problem by its inability to commit are complicated. We therefore
resort to approximation methods of the sort that are widely used in monetary economics (see, e.g.,
Woodford, 2003; and Benigno and Woodford, 2004). We approximate the ﬁrm’s problem around its
steady state solution under full commitment to a state-contingent rule and assume that exogenous
shocks and the habit coeﬃcient, γ, are small. In addition, we make several simplifying assumptions
about functional form: We assume that the ﬁrm’s production function is linear; that Mt,t+j = βj;
that Ct and Pt are constant; and that Wt, At and θt are i.i.d. The details of our derivations are
presented in appendix A.
When the ﬁrm is able to commit to a fully state contingent rule it chooses to set its price such
that
ˆ pt(z) = ˆ St + t, (5)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady state of the corresponding un-
hatted variables, St denotes marginal costs and t = −ˆ θt/(θ − 1) denotes shocks to demand.9 We
deﬁne Φt ≡ ˆ St + t and refer to Φt as the ﬁrm’s desired price.
9For robustness, in appendix A we also drive the exact solution to the ﬁrm’s problem under commitment without
imposing the simplifying assumptions discussed above but instead assuming that θt is a constant. In this case, the
price of the good also varies one for one in percentage terms with marginal costs.
8Notice that the ﬁrm’s desired pricing policy does not exhibit any real rigidity.10 This contrasts
with the results of earlier customer market models such as those in Phelps and Winter (1970) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1995) in which the consumer demand function is not derived from
micro-foundations. In these papers, ﬁrms optimally vary their price less than one for one with
marginal costs. Thus, markups vary countercyclically.
One of the ideas earlier customer markets models meant to capture in a reduced form way was
that consumers face switching costs. In these models, ﬁrms can invest in a “customer base” by
lowering their current price. New customers are then reluctant to switch to another ﬁrm since
this entails that they incur a switching cost. Each ﬁrm’s customer base is therefore a slow moving
variable. When ﬁrms are hit by a shock to marginal costs they are reluctant to raise their price
since a higher price would erode their customer base. As a consequence of this, ﬁrm prices exhibit
real rigidity.11
The crucial diﬀerence between our model and earlier customer markets models is that in our
model consumers realize that their demand in future periods depends on their actions in the current
period. This entails that consumers decide to become customers of a particular ﬁrm not only based
on the current price of the ﬁrm’s product but also based on their expectations about its future
prices. In contrast, the earlier customer market literature assumes that changes in a ﬁrm’s market
share are a function only of the ﬁrm’s current price, which is not consistent with the interpretation
that consumer’s reluctance to switch is due to switching costs. Surely consumers realize that if
they become customers of a particular ﬁrm they will become partially locked into that relationship
in the future. Equation (5) shows that, given the consumption aggregator (1), it is optimal for a
ﬁrm facing forward looking consumers to let its price vary one-for-one in percentage terms with
marginal costs.
Next, consider the optimal pricing strategy of a ﬁrm that is not able to make time-inconsistent
commitments. In appendix A, we show that, to a ﬁrst order approximation, the “discretionary”




+ ˆ St + t, (6)
10We deﬁne real rigidity as a situation in which the pricing decisions of diﬀerent ﬁrms are strategic complements.
11Ravn et al. (2005) show that a model in which consumers have good-speciﬁc external habit yields the consumer
demand function assumed in the earlier customer markets literature.
9where hatted variables again denote the percentage diﬀerence from the steady state under commit-
ment. The positive constant term in this equation implies that producers of habit-forming goods
set higher prices on average if they are not able to make time-inconsistent commitments. Their
inability to make commitments leads them to exploit the habit of their customers to a greater
extent than is optimal. The higher price implies a lower demand and lower proﬁts for the ﬁrm.
The higher price, of course, also hurts consumers. The ﬁrm’s inability to make time-inconsistent
commitments therefore leads to lower social welfare as well as lower proﬁts for the ﬁrm.12
The idea that ﬁrms have an incentive to price gouge when consumers are locked into a relation-
ship with the ﬁrm is not new. This idea has been explored in Cremer (1984), Farell and Shapiro
(1989), Klemperer (1995), Bagwell (2004) and Caminal (2004). All these papers diﬀer in signiﬁcant
ways from our paper. None of them explore how lock-in eﬀects can lead to price rigidity as we do in
section 4. Nor do they discuss optimal ﬁrm behavior when the ﬁrm’s desired price is unobservable
to its customers as we do in section 5.
4 Equilibrium Price Rigidity
Our results in section 3 imply that the ability to make price commitments is valuable to a ﬁrm since
it alleviates the ﬁrm’s time-inconsistency problem. This raises a familiar question: How does the
ﬁrm make credible commitments? One approach is for the ﬁrm to build a reputation for oﬀering
low prices.13 A key diﬀerence between our model and the standard “no-habit” model is that in
our model there exist a multitude of equilibria in which the ﬁrm is induced not to deviate from
otherwise time-inconsistent actions by the threat that a deviation would damage its reputation and
trigger an adverse shift in consumers’ expectations about its future prices.
One pricing rule that, in principle, may be sustained by a ﬁrm’s reputation is the fully state-
contingent commitment rule described in section 3. However, equilibria involving much simpler
pricing rules also exist in our model. In particular, equilibria exist in which the ﬁrm sets rigid
12In discussing the commitment case, we emphasized that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to vary its price one-for-one in
percentage terms with marginal costs. While equation (6) seems to indicate that the same is true in the discretion
case, we would like to caution that, in contrast to the commitment case, this result holds only approximately in the
discretion case. While the solution to the commitment case is exact, the solution to the discretion case and all the
cases considered later in the paper rely on an approximation. In these cases, the fact that the ﬁrm’s price varies
one-for-one with marginal costs follows from the assumption that the habit coeﬃcient is small.
13We discuss other commitment mechanisms below.
10prices. To show formally that such equilibria exist, we must show that the the ﬁrm can attain
higher proﬁts if it is able to ﬁx its price for multiple periods than it can attain under discretion.14
Consider a ﬁrm that is identical to the one analyzed in section 3 except that it is able to ﬁx its
price for two periods. Assume that the ﬁrm is otherwise not able to make any time-inconsistent
commitments about its pricing policy. In appendix A we show that the optimal pricing policy of
such a ﬁrm is
ˆ pt(z) =
γ




(St + t). (7)
This policy diﬀers in two ways from the pricing behavior of a ﬁrm that follows the discretionary
pricing policy. The beneﬁt that comes from ﬁxing the price for two periods is that the average level
of the price is lower than under complete discretion. The average price is lower because the ﬁrm
recognizes that a high price in period t raises consumer’s expectations about the price in period
t+1 and therefore raises the consumer’s cost of forming a habit in the good. Since this lowering of
the average price brings the average price closer to what it would be under commitment to a fully
state-contingent rule, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are higher in this case than they are under discretion.
The cost of ﬁxing the price for more than one period is that the ﬁrm is not able to respond
optimally to ﬂuctuations in marginal costs and demand. Instead of responding one-for-one in
percentage terms to such variations, the ﬁrm only changes its price by 1/(1 + β) percent for each
percentage deviation in marginal costs and demand. The simple intuition for this result is that the
ﬁrm is choosing a price that is appropriate not only for the current period but for the entire period
during which the price is ﬁxed and it is discounting the future by a factor β. This feature of the
ﬁrm’s pricing policy lowers its proﬁts relative to what they are under discretion.
Whether it is beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm to be able to ﬁx its price for more than one period therefore
depends on the relative strength of these two eﬀects. In appendix A we show that it is beneﬁcial




var(ˆ St + t). (8)
This expression has a straight-forward interpretation. It says that being able to commit to a ﬁxed
price for two periods yields higher proﬁts if the size of the habit coeﬃcient—i.e., the strength of
the habit—is large relative to the variability of marginal costs and demand.
14The existence of such equilibria also relies on the discount factor of the ﬁrm being close enough to one, as is
standard in trigger-strategy equilibria.
11We have analyzed the simple case of a ﬁrm that is able to ﬁx its price for two periods. The
results above can, however, easily be extended to the case of a ﬁrm that is able to ﬁx its price
for n periods. Another simplifying assumption employed above is that the aggregate price level is
constant. This assumption is also easily relaxed. Commiting to a ﬁxed nominal price is beneﬁcial
to the ﬁrm as long as variations in the price level are not too large.15
The fact that the ﬁxed price policy is preferable to the discretionary policy from the ﬁrm’s
perspective means that price rigidity is an equilibrium outcome of our model. In this equilibrium
the ﬁrm commits to a sticky price and the threat of consumer beliefs reverting to the discretionary
equilibrium induces the ﬁrm to follow through on its commitment.
A fundamental diﬀerence between our model and the standard “no-habit” model thus arises
with respect to the viability of equilibria involving nominal rigidity. Our model has a multiplicity
of equilibria, some of which involve nominal rigidity. In contrast, the no-habit model has a unique
equilibrium and this equilibrium does not entail nominal price rigidity. The equilibrium is unique
because consumers’ expectations about the ﬁrm’s future prices don’t aﬀect current demand. Shifts
in these expectations don’t aﬀect the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Threats of such shifts therefore cannot be used
to sustain a range of equilibria.
The presence of nominal price rigidity in the set of equilibrium outcomes of our model has an
important parallel in the recent literature on wage stickiness. Hall (2005) shows that nominal wage
stickiness can also arise as an equilibrium outcome in search models of the labor market. Hall’s
results follow from the fact that the outcome of the bargain between workers and ﬁrms, once they
have been matched, is indeterminate in such models.
We have analyzed three equilibria of our model: commitment to a fully state contingent rule,
complete discretion and an equilibrium in which the price is ﬁxed for two periods. Clearly, many
other equilibria exist. Wether price rigidity arises therefore becomes a question of equilibrium
selection. The equilibrium most prefered by the ﬁrm is the fully state contingent commitment
rule—equation (5). However, conveying such a complicated commitment to consumers may be
diﬃcult and poses a risk of misunderstandings that may lead to adverse shifts in consumer beliefs.
15Notice that given a similar condition to condition (8), consumers also prefer the two period ﬁxed price policy—
equation (7)—to the discretionary price policy—equation (6). The fact that the average price is lower makes con-
sumers better oﬀ. The eﬀect of lowering the variability of prices is however ambiguous. If the habit is large enough
relative to the variability of price, the ﬁrst eﬀect will outway the second eﬀect.
12Furthermore, it may not be possible, even in principle, for a ﬁrm to commit to such a rule if the
ﬁrm’s marginal costs and demand are unobservable. A simpler, less risky pricing rule may therefore
arise in the market such as sticky price rule described above or the price cap rule discussed in section
5.
Reputational equilibria of the kind discussed above provide a rational interpretation for the
notion of “implicit contracts” discussed informally by Okun (1981) and found by Blinder et al.
(1998) to be an important source of price rigidity. In Blinder et al. (1998), 64.5% of ﬁrms report
that they have implicit contracts with their consumers and an overwhelming majority of these ﬁrms
(79%) indicate that these implicit contracts are an important source of price rigidity. Surveys in
many other countries have since conﬁrmed this result (see footnote 2). Furthermore, the punishment
phase of such reputation equilibria provides an interpretation for consumers’ adverse reactions to
price increases, not justiﬁed by observable increases in costs. Consumers often perceive such price
increases as “unfair” (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; and Rotemberg, 2002 and 2004). In the
reputational equilibria, it is exactly these types of price increases that lead to adverse reactions by
customers.
Aside from repuation, there are a number of other mechanisms that a ﬁrm has at its disposal to
make commitments. Menu costs and other barriers to price changes, can help a ﬁrm commit not to
change its prices. Levy et al. (1997) present evidence that supermarkets face physical, managerial
and communication-related costs of changing prices. Since it is optimal for ﬁrms to economize on
such costs, it may be impractical for them to commit to a state-contingent rule. The menu cost
will tilt the ﬁrm’s incentives away from changing its price and therefore make it more likely that
the ﬁrm’s current price will not change in the near future. Just as in the simple case analyzed
above, such price rigidity implies that a price increase in period t raises consumer’s expectations
about the price in the near future and therefore raises the consumer’s cost of forming a habit in
the good. Menu costs and other barriers to price changes can therefore be beneﬁcial to a ﬁrm since
they reduce the ﬁrm’s incentive to take advantage of locked in customers.
One reason why one might be skeptical of menu costs as an explanation of price rigidity is
that one might think that technologies exits that make changing prices easy and cheap (see, e.g.,
Dutta et al., 1999). However, the argument above suggests that ﬁrms might have an incentive to
intentionally adopt technologies and an organizational structure that makes changing prices costly
13as part of a commitment not to take advantage of locked in customers. In most models of price
rigidity, it is assumed that ﬁrms are forced to change their price infrequently. In such models price
rigidity hurts the ﬁrms, although their losses are only second order (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1985;
and Mankiw, 1985). Our model suggests that ﬁrms would actually like to be able to commit to
change prices infrequently if state-contingent commitments are not possible.16
Another approach to making credible commitments is for the ﬁrm to sign binding contracts with
its customers. Much like reputation formation, explicit contracts are an imperfect commitment
mechanism. Contracts are costly to write, interpret and enforce. Furthermore, these costs rise with
the length and complexity of the contract. Such costs can explain why empirical evidence suggests
that ﬁxed price contracts are quite common in one form or another in interactions between ﬁrms
and their customers. Blinder et al. (1998) presents evidence to this eﬀect. In their sample, 65% of
ﬁrms had a meaningful volume of contracts that speciﬁed a ﬁxed nominal price and 57% of these
ﬁrms indicated that such nominal contracts were an important source of price rigidity. Explicit
contracts have since been found to rank among the most important sources of price rigidity in many
other countries (see footnote 2).17
5 Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information
Many components of a typical ﬁrm’s marginal costs and demand are either unobservable or very
costly for a consumer to observe. In section 3, we show that in a complete information setting the
ﬁrm’s desired pricing policy under full commitment is a function of the ﬁrm’s marginal costs and
its demand. If marginal costs and demand are unobservable, it is not possible, even in principle,
for a ﬁrm to commit to such a rule since there is no way for consumers to verify whether the ﬁrm
deviates from this rule or not. This observation raises the question: What is the optimal pricing
16Nishimura (2000) also discusses possible beneﬁts of price rigidity. His argument for the beneﬁts of price rigidity
is however quite diﬀerent.
17All the results of this section and section 3 hold not only when γ ≥ 0 but also for γ < 0. As we mentioned
in footnote 7, the demand curve—equation (2)—with γ < 0 may be interpreted as describing consumer demand for
goods for which consumer’s purchases in the recent past negatively aﬀect their current demand. Durable goods are
examples of such goods. In this case the ﬁrm faces a slightly diﬀerent time-inconsistency problem. It would like to
be able to commit not to lower its price in the immediate future since expectations of low future prices will lead
consumers to delay their purchases. This implies that ﬁrms again have an incentive to make repricing costly in order
to make it more credible that they will not “take advantage of past customers” by lowering their price.
14policy for the ﬁrm when it has private information about its desired price?18
It turns out that this question is formally related to the problem studied by Athey et al. (2004).
They study the time-inconsistency problem of a central bank that has private information about
the state of the economy. Using methods developed by Abreu et al. (1990), they are able to show
that under relatively mild restrictions this type of problem has a surprisingly simple solution. In
this section, we use the results of Athey et al. (2004) to show that the ﬁrm’s optimal policy when
it has private information about its desired price is to commit to a “price cap”. More speciﬁcally,
when the ﬁrm’s desired price is relatively low it acts with discretion but when the desired price
is high enough that discretionary price setting would entail a price above the price cap it sets its
price equal to the price cap. Athey et al. (2004) refer to this as bounded discretion. The level of
the price cap depends on the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, which in turn depends
on the strength of the habit that consumers develop in the ﬁrm’s good. The more severe is the
time-inconsistency problem, the lower is the price cap.
Formally, we show in appendix B that:
I. If γ > −ˆ Φ, the ﬁrm sets a constant price.
II. If γ < −ˆ Φ, the ﬁrm’s optimal policy is to commit to a price cap.
Here ˆ Φ < 0 is the lowest possible realization of the ﬁrm’s desired price. Let ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ;z) denote the
static best response of a ﬁrm with desired price equal to ˆ Φ. If a ﬁrm’s desired price is lower than
ˆ Φ∗, the ﬁrm sets its price equal to ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ;z). However, whenever the ﬁrm’s desired price is higher
than ˆ Φ∗, the ﬁrm sets its price equal to the static best response of a ﬁrm with desired price equal





ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ;z) if ˆ Φ ∈ [ˆ Φ, ˆ Φ∗]
ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ∗;z) if ˆ Φ ∈ [ˆ Φ∗, ¯ ˆ Φ].
(9)
In appendix B, we show that the cutoﬀ level of the ﬁrm’s desired price, ˆ Φ∗, is decreasing in γ.
Thus, the ﬁrm’s desire to limit its discretion increases with the severity of the time-inconsistency
problem.
18For simplicity, in this section we assume that the ﬁrm’s private information is the only impediment it faces to
making commitments about its pricing policy.
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The results above show that the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy when it has private information
about its desired price is one in which its price is upward rigid at a price cap. Below this cap
the ﬁrm’s price is ﬂexible. Even a casual look at time series of goods prices reveals that exactly
these features—a rigid price cap and frequent and ﬂexible sales—appear to be salient features of
goods prices. In section 6, we provide formal empirical evidence that shows that these empirical
predictions of our model are indeed prominent features of retail prices.
Notice also that we have shown that the price cap policy is the best policy from the ﬁrm’s
perspective of all policies that do not depend on the ﬁrm’s contemporaneous desired price. This
policy is therefore more desirable for the ﬁrm than the ﬁxed price policy we discussed in section
4. This provides a rationale for why ﬁrms that are unable to make complicated commitments
may choose a price cap policy even if their inability to commit is not strictly due to asymmetric
information. Moreover, consumers also have an incentive to move from the discretionary equilibrium
to the price cap policy since it lowers the average price of the good.
Here we have derived results for the simple case in which the consumer cannot observe any of
the variables that the ﬁrm would like to make its price depend on. Our results can, however, be
extended to a setting in which the consumer observes some such variables but not others. In this
case, the variables that the consumer observes are state variables and theﬁrm-ptiomal pricing rule
is a price cap that depends on these variables.
6 Empirical Evidence
In this section we present several diﬀerent types of empirical evidence supporting our model of price
rigidity. We ﬁrst present two kinds of new evidence on price rigidity: evidence from retail price
data on the behavior of regular prices and sale prices and evidence on company announcements
about their future prices. We then discuss three sets of existing evidence supporting our model.
19As with the earlier sections, the results of this section may also be extended to the case of γ < 0. In this case
the optimal pricing policy from the ﬁrm’s perspective is a “price ﬂoor” rather than a price cap. This is because in
the γ < 0 case the ﬁrm’s time-inconsistency problem leads ﬁrms to set too low prices rather than too high prices (see
footnote 17).
166.1 New Evidence from Retail Prices
In section 5, we show that our model has the following empirical prediction: Goods prices should
spend a signiﬁcant portion of their time at a rigid upper bound. Below this upper bound, they
should exhibit much more ﬂexibility. In tables 1 and 2, we use weekly price data from the Dominick’s
Finer Foods (DFF) dataset provided by the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business to
show that these predictions are indeed borne out by data on retail goods prices.20 More precisely,
the results presented in tables 1 and 2 along with the fact that we very rarely observe “reverse-
sales”—i.e., brief periods during which the price of a good rises above its regular price and then
returns back to the regular price—show that: i) The regular price of a good remains ﬁxed for long
periods of time, but during this time the good frequently goes on sale for brief periods; ii) Regular
prices are a sticky upper bound for the price of a good; iii) Prices generally return to their old
regular price after sales; and iv) Sale prices are more than 8 times more ﬂexible than regular prices.
For robustness, the statistics in tables 1 and 2 are presented separately for each of 26 categories of
goods. Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004) document similar qualitative results to (i) and (ii) for a panel of
monthly data from 30 U.S. metropolitan areas.
The concept of a “regular price” is familiar in the literature on retail prices. Chevalier et al.
(2003) comment,
In general, pricing at DFF (and, we believe, at all supermarkets) is characterized by
temporary discounting. Prices frequently drop to a temporary sale price and return
again to the “normal” price. The path of prices for a typical good (9.5 ounce Triscuit
crackers) in our study can be seen in Figure 1. Notice that, during the 7.5 years of our
study, Triscuits appear to have only eight “regular prices”. Upward deviations from the
regular price are virtually nonexistant; temporary downward deviations are frequent.
The labeling of promotions in the Dominick’s dataset is, however, somewhat undependable.21 More-
over, what we typically view as a sale—i.e., a short-term decrease in prices relative to a recurrent
20DFF is the second-largest supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan area with approximately 100 stores
and a 25% market share. DFF provided the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business (GSB) with weekly
store-level scanner data, available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/. See Chevalier et
al. (2003) for a more detailed description of this data set. We use data from store number 126 since the data from
this store has the least missing data points.
21According the University of Chicago GSB website describing the data, “if the variable is set it indicates a
promotion, if it is not set, there might still be a promotion that week”.
17upper bound—is more closely related to the time series behavior of prices than the presence of a
promotion. We therefore identify sales directly from observations on prices as periods when the
price drops for a short period and then returns to either a previously occurring regular price or to
a new regular price that reoccurs soon after.22 The “sales ﬁlter” used to identify sales is described
in detail in appendix C. To give the reader a feel for this procedure, we present several ﬁgures
showing the original and “regular price” series for popular items in appendix C. The ﬁgures show
that the regular price series generated by this procedure corresponds well with our intuition about
how to deﬁne a sale. The price series have infrequent adjustments in regular prices and frequent
sales. When no recurring regular price can be identiﬁed from the data, the sales ﬁlter simply sets
the regular price equal to the observed price. Thus, a continuously adjusting price series would
have the regular price always equal to the actual price—i.e., no sales—with a regular price change
in every period.
A very irregular pattern of sales, such as the one near the end of Figure 2, is not identiﬁed by
the sales ﬁlter. The sales ﬁlter is, thus, somewhat conservative in assigning variation in prices to
sales rather than the regular price. This tendency biases us away from ﬁnding a high frequency of
sales, and a low frequency of price adjustment of regular prices—two of the key ﬁndings discussed in
this section. Another comforting fact about our procedure is that the qualitative ﬁndings (i)- (iv)
are not at all sensitive to the exact parameters used in the sales ﬁlter. Furthermore, Hosken and
Reiﬀen (2004) document very similar qualitative results for (i) and (ii) using an entirely diﬀerent
data set and a diﬀerent procedure for identifying sales.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 presents the fraction of weeks in which the price of the good was
equal to the regular price. One minus this number is the fraction of time the good was on sale. By
our measure, sales occur about 13% of the time. The ﬁrst column of table 2 establishes furthermore
that this regular price often remains ﬁxed for signiﬁcant periods of time—the frequency of price
adjustment of regular prices is 6.1% or less in more than half of the categories.
The pricing dynamics observed in the data are hard to reconcile with the standard menu cost
model of price rigidity. In this model, the ﬁrm should always readjust the regular price when a sale
ends. Yet, after a large number of sales, the price returns to the original regular price. Column 2 of
22This procedure has the advantage over the procedure suggested in Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004)—of deﬁning sales
as percentage deviations from the modal price—that it can accomodate variation in the regular price witin a year
and allows for sales that last more than one period.
18table 1 shows that for most products the price of the product returns to the original regular price
over 90 percent of the time following a sale.23 Given the high frequency of sales in retail data, this
statistic implies that the opportunity to adjust a price following a sale is often forgone. Indeed the
condition that the price returns to the original price following a price decrease is sometimes use
as a criterion for identifying a sale in other papers in the literature (see, e.g., Hosken and Reiﬀen,
2004Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004)).
The observed pricing dynamics are also diﬃcult to reconcile with the existing literature on sales.
An important explanation for sales in the industrial organization literature is price discrimination
(see, e.g., Varian, 1980). The intuition for this theory of sales is that sales allow for price discrim-
ination between shoppers with diﬀerent price elasticities. However, these models do not provide
an explanation for the existence of a rigid regular price that truncates the price distribution from
above unless consumer valuations are also truncated from above.
The results in table 2 show that sale prices are considerably more variable than regular prices.
The fourth column of table 2 reports the number of unique sale values as a fraction of the total
number of weeks spent on sale. This statistic would equal 1 if there were a unique sale price in
every period and would approach zero if only one sale price was ever visited. The median value of
this fraction across categories is 43%. In contrast, the fraction of unique regular price values as a
fraction of total time at regular prices is about 10 time smaller—4.5% or less for the majority of
items.24 The data are not, therefore, consistent with the idea that the price always returns to a
particular sale price when the product goes on sale.
A slightly diﬀerent way of analyzing the relative rigidity of sale prices is to look at the tendency
of prices to adjust while the product is on sale versus at other times. Recall that our procedure
for identifying sales allows for sales that last for more than one week. Multi-week sales account
for somewhat less than half of sales in most categories. The ﬁrst two columns of table 2 compare
the frequency of price adjustment for regular prices versus sale prices during multi-week sales, not
including the price changes at the start and end of the sale. The frequency of price adjustment
during sales is about 8 times as high as the frequency of adjustment of the regular price. Existing
23This is not by construction. Our sales ﬁlter allows for sales that do not return to the original price following the
sale, as we discuss in C.
24An even higher fraction of sale prices are unique if the prices are deﬁned in terms of percent oﬀ the regular price,
or an absolute amount oﬀ the regular price.
19menu cost models of price rigidity do not provide any reason why the price of a good should be
more ﬂexible when it is on sale. As we showed in section 5, this pricing pattern is however a natural
implication of our model. Again, these empirical facts do not arise from the particular approach
used to identify sales, since our algorithm does not make any assumptions about the dynamics of
prices during a sale.
From the perspective of the customer markets model presented in this paper, this pattern of
pricing reﬂects the fact that the ﬁrm chooses to commit to a sticky regular price. Indeed, many
retail stores choose to employ observably less permanent technologies for posting sale versus regular
prices. This suggests that menu costs may be smaller for temporary price changes than for changes
in the regular price. However, a model with such diﬀerential menu costs on its own is not fully
consistent with the data since it implies that we should observe reverse sales as frequently as we
observe sales. The model presented in section 5 shows that committing to a sticky regular price,
but allowing sale prices to ﬂuctuate, is preferable from the perspective of the ﬁrm to ﬁxing its price
for multiple periods or other types of pricing rules that do not depend on costs. Indeed, the results
of Section 5 imply that this pricing rule is close to optimal in the class of all possible rules if the
cost and demand factors aﬀecting the optimal pricing of a supermarket are unobservable (or costly
to observe) for consumers.
6.2 New Evidence from Company Announcements
If barriers to price adjustment are a hindrance to ﬁrms, why do ﬁrms self-impose restrictions to
their future prices? On May 23 2002, Marvel CEO Bill Jemas began a pricing conference with the
statement: “Read my lips, we will not raise prices.” On Oct 9 2000, Revlon Inc. announced as
part of its new terms of trade a “commitment not to raise prices for its retail partners in 2001”.
On Dec 1 2004, Apple Computer “ﬂatly denied a report that...[it] was planning to raise prices for
songs bought on the popular iTunes online music store...‘These rumors aren’t true,’ said Apple
spokeswoman Natalie Sequerira. ‘We have multiyear agreements with the labels and our prices
remain 99c a track.’ ” On Aug 24 2004, B. Muthuraman, managing director of Tata Steel said,
“We will not increase prices for both our direct customers as well as our retail customers til March
2005.” These examples were collected from news articles and company webpages on the internet.
A number of similar examples from the steel industry, power and electricity, petroleum and gas,
20telephone services, internet service providers and other industrial and consumer goods industries
are presented in table 3.
In some cases, an explanation is provided. The large fence manufacturer Sarel states:
Sarel...has had no price increases for more than ﬁve years and no price changes are
expected in the forseeable future.... When [the customers have] made their choice, the
exceptional stability of our prices means that they know not only that they’re getting
superb value for their money today, but also that they will continue to do so in the
future.
A small photoﬁnishing company “Color Express” states:
Once we publish our price list, our track record proves that we commit to those prices:
it’s not uncommon to maintain prices for one or two years barring signiﬁcant increases
in the paper industry. Take a look at other published prices, and you will ﬁnd revi-
sions sometimes as frequently as every 3-6 months. Even if the competitions prices are
“slashed”, doesn’t it make you wonder?
Though far from conclusive, these anecdotes provide concrete examples of ﬁrms “committing to a
sticky price”, sometimes for the stated purpose of aﬀecting consumers’ future price expectations.25
6.3 Survey Evidence on the Reasons for Price Rigidity
An important source of evidence on price rigidity and the reasons for price rigidity is surveys. An
inﬂuential survey on price rigidity was conducted by Blinder et al. (1998) for U.S. manufacturing
ﬁrms. Blinder et al. interviewed managers at about 200 ﬁrms and asked them how often they
changed their prices and why they didn’t change them more often. This type of study has since
been conduced in a host of other countries using similar methodology and in some cases with a
much larger sample size than Blinder et al.’s original survey (see footnote 2).
The results of these surveys are strikingly similar across countries. A major conclusion of these
studies is that the primary reason why ﬁrms seem to be reluctant to change their prices is because
their customers don’t like price variability rather than because such variability is costly for the
ﬁrm independent of customer reactions. The importance of customer-based explanations for price
25Another potential explanation for ﬁrms pre-announcing their prices is collusion.
21rigidity is reﬂected in robustly high scores for the ‘implicit contracts’ explanation for price rigidity
and the robustly low scores for the menu cost and ﬁrm information cost explanations. Follow up
questions in Blinder’s survey also strongly suggest that the main concern that ﬁrms have with
changing their prices is antagonizing customers.
6.4 Are Prices More Rigid in Customer Markets?
If consumer lock-in is an important source of price rigidity, we should observe stickier prices in
ﬁrms that have more repeat customers. The existing survey and experimental evidence on the
relationship between “customer markets” and price rigidity, though limited, suggests that this is
indeed the case.
In an experiment on price-setting in customer markets, Cason and Friedman (2002) show that
higher search costs lead customers to remain with sellers for longer periods. Sellers respond to
this increase in loyalty with signiﬁcantly more rigid prices. Renner and Tyran (2004) study a
setting in which buyers are uncertain about the quality of competing products. They show that
the price rigidity is more pronounced in a customer market than a market without repeat customers
following an increase in costs, and that price rigidity is more pronounced if the increase in costs is
unobservable than if it is public information. The latter ﬁnding lines up well with our results in
Section 5.
Survey evidence also suggests that the link between customer markets and price rigidity may
be important. In a survey of British ﬁrms, Hall et al. (1997) ﬁnd that companies with over 75%
of their customer relationships lasting for longer than ﬁve years rated ﬁxed-price contracts as more
important than ﬁrms with a smaller fraction of long-term customers. Small and Yates (1999) ﬁnd
that customer turnover seems to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the responsiveness of prices to changes
in cost, but not to changes in demand. Carlton (1986) ﬁnds no evidence for a relationship between
price rigidity and the importance of long-term contracts in a cross-industry study of the Stigler-
Kindahl data set. However, the number of observations in Carlton’s study is small and the result
may be confounded by other diﬀerences across industries.
226.5 Are Prices More Rigid for Existing Customers?
Another empirical implication of the model presented in sections 2-5 (more precisely, a slight ex-
tension of that model) is that if it is possible to price discriminate between new and old customers,
prices for new customers should not exhibit the same degree of rigidity as prices for existing cus-
tomers. This is because the ﬁrm does not face a time inconsistency problem vis-a-vis its new
customers since the new customers are not yet locked in by past purchases. The practive of main-
taining ﬁxed prices for existing customers when prices for new customers are changed is referred
to as “grandfathering” old prices for existing customers. This practice has been studied in the
economics literature are for housing rents and long distance phone services. Genesove (2003) shows
that the rent on an apartment is about twice as likely to change when a new tenant moves in as
when an old tenant signs a new lease. Epling (2002) shows that long distance telephone companies
often maintain ﬁxed prices for existing customers when they change prices for new customers.
The results of Carlton (1986) also suggest more rigidity to existing customers. Carlton uses
the Stigler-Kindahl data set to show that prices for a particular buyer are rigid for long periods of
time and contrasts this with the results of Stigler and Kindahl (1970). Stigler and Kindahl show
that price indexes of average transaction prices are quite ﬂexible. Together these two facts strongly
suggest that prices for existing customers are more rigid than prices for new customers for the
Stigler-Kindahl data.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show that time non-separabilities in consumer demand imply that ﬁrms face a
time-inconsistency problem when they are choosing prices. They would like to promise low prices
in the future. But when the future arrives they have an incentive to take advantage of consumers’
habits and price gouge. In this model, price rigidity arises as an equilibrium outcome. Moreover,
ﬁrms may beneﬁt from menu costs since they help ﬁrms commit not to price gouge. The ﬁrms’
optimal policy is to commit to a state-contingent pricing policy. However, there are various reasons
why this pricing rule may not be selected in the market. One reason is that the ﬁrms’ marginal costs
and demand may not be observable. Another reason is that it may be costly to write complicated
contracts or commit to a complicated pricing rule.
23If ﬁrms have private information about their desired prices, the optimal pricing policy is to
commit to a price cap. Our model therefore implies that prices should spend a signiﬁcant portion
of their time at a rigid upper bound. Below this upper bound, they should be much more ﬂexible.
As we show in section 6, the behavior of retail prices bears a striking resemblance to this price cap
policy. In contrast, the combination of a rigid regular price and frequent sales is diﬃcult to explain
within standard models of menu costs. Our model also provides an explanation for the tendency
of ﬁrms to cite adverse customer reations as an important reason for price rigidity, the tendency of
prices to be more rigid in customer markets, and the tendency of prices to existing consumers to
be more rigid than prices to new consumers.
24A Solutions to Firm Optimization
A.1 Exact Solution in the Case of Full Commitment
Under the assumption of full commitment with a constant elasticity of demand θ, the ﬁrm’s prob-
lem can be solved analytically without any simplifying assumptions. The ﬁrm seeks to maximize
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Notice that this equation implies that under full commitment the ﬁrm sets prices in exactly the
same way as it would if consumers did not have good speciﬁc habits.
A.2 A Derivation of a 2nd Order Approximation to the Firm’s Value
Given the simplifying assumption that the ﬁrm’s production function is linear we can substitute it








26Throughout the paper we focus on bounded solutions. The transversality condtions of the various dynamic
optimization problems solved in the paper always hold for all bounded solutions. We therefore ignore transversality
conditions elsewhere in the paper.








where variables without subscripts denote steady state values. Notice furthermore that equation
(1) implies that C = (1 − γ)c(z) and equation (2) implies that (1 − γβ)P = p(z). A second order
Taylor series approximation of the value of the ﬁrm around the steady state of the solution in
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+ ex. terms + O(||ξ||3),(10)
where “ex. terms” stands for terms that are exogenous to the ﬁrm’s decision problem, ξ stands for
a vector of the exogenous variables and O(||ξ||3) denotes higher order terms.
The exposition of our results is simpliﬁed if we make a change of variables. Let ˆ ct(z) =
log(ct(z)/c(z)) and deﬁne hatted versions of all other variables in the same way. Making use
of the fact that
ct(z) = c(z)
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where ˆ St = ( ˆ Wt − ˆ At).
A.3 Firm Behavior in the Case of Full Commitment













t(z) − ˆ ct(z)ˆ θt =




t(z) + γβEtˆ ct+1(z) + O(||ξ,γ||3). (12)
26We can rearrange this equation so that it says that
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+ ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3). (13)
In the last two steps of this derivation we have assumed that the ﬁrm solves its problem from the
“timeless perspective” (see Woodford, 2003, and Benigno and Woodford, 2004). In this problem,
this assumption amounts to assuming that the ﬁrm is able to make its commitment at least one
period before its policy takes eﬀect so as to be able to aﬀect consumer expectations about its policy
in the ﬁrst period. If we assumed that the ﬁrm did not optimize from the timeless perspective,
the expression above would have an extra ˆ ct(z) term in the ﬁrst period which would imply that
the ﬁrm would behave diﬀerently in the ﬁrst period compared with all subseqent periods. The
special aspects of the ﬁrm’s behavior in the ﬁrst period would reﬂect the fact that it was taking
past expectations as given in the ﬁrst period while it was seeking to aﬀect future expectations by
its commitment. We assume that the ﬁrm optimizes from the timeless perspective simply in order
to be able to abstract from any special behavoir of the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period.
If we now multiply expression (13) by (1 − γ)(1 − γ − γβ), use consumer demand to substitute









t(z) − ˆ θtˆ pt(z) + (θ − 1)ˆ Stˆ pt(z)

+ ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Setting the derivative of this with respect to ˆ pt(z) equal to zero shows that the ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing policy under full commitment to a state-contingent rule is




27up to an error of order O(||ξ,γ||2).
A.4 Firm Behavior in the Case of Complete Discretion
While consumer demand is again given by equation (12) in the case of full discretion, the ﬁrm must
take the expectations of the consumers as given when it chooses how to set its price. We guess that
equilibrium consumption may be represented by
ˆ ct = a1 + a2 ˆ St + O(||ξ,γ||2),
where a1 and a2 are undetermined coeﬃcients. Since ˆ St is i.i.d., we have that
Etˆ ct+1 = a1 + O(||ξ,γ||2).
Notice that we need only use a ﬁrst order approximation to the expectations of the agents since
these expectations are multiplied by γ in equation (12) and we are assuming that γ is small. If we












t(z) − ˆ ct(z)ˆ θt =




t(z) + γβa1 + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Slight manipulation of this equation yields
−θˆ pt(z) =
1
1 − γ − γβ
ˆ ct(z) −
γ
1 − γ − γβ
ˆ ct−1(z) −
γβa1
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+ ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).
28Next we multiply the above equation by (1 − γ)(1 − γ − γβ), use consumer demand to substitute









(θ − 1)ˆ p2
t(z) − ˆ θtˆ pt(z) + (θ − 1)ˆ Stˆ pt(z)

+ ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Here we use the fact that a1 is of order O(||ξ,γ||). Setting the derivative of this with respect to








up to an error of order O(||ξ,γ||2).
A.5 Firm Behavior when Prices are Fixed for Two Periods
Let’s next consider a case in which the ﬁrm is able to keep its price ﬁxed for two periods. In a period
t in which the ﬁrm is able to change its price, both the ﬁrm and consumers know that the price in
period t+1 will be the same as the price at time t, i.e., they know that ˆ pt+1(z) = ˆ pt(z). This implies
that ˆ ct+1(z) = ˆ ct(z)+O(||ξ,γ||2). The price set by the ﬁrm at time t therefore aﬀects the consumer’s
expectations about outcomes in period t+1. The ﬁrm, however, takes the consumer’s expectations
about outcomes at t + 1 + j for j ≥ 1 as given. We guess that Etˆ ct+1+j(z) = a1 + O(||ξ,γ||2)
is appropriate. All this implies that the demand curve of the consumers imposes the following



































Etˆ ct+2(z) − γˆ ct+1(z) = −θEtˆ pt+2(z) + s.o.ex.terms + O(||ξ,γ||3),
Etˆ ct+j(z) = −θEtˆ pt+j(z) + s.o.ex.terms + O(||ξ,γ||3),
for j ≥ 2, where s.o.ex.terms stands for “second order exogenous terms”.
29A second order approximation of the value of the ﬁrm is again given by expression (11). In this


































































for j > 2. Next we plug the constraints implied by the demand curve into this expression. After





















t(z) + ˆ pt(z)ˆ ct(z)

+ ex.terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).






(1 + β)(θ − 1)ˆ p2
t(z) − ˆ θtˆ pt(z) + (θ − 1)ˆ Stˆ pt(z)

+ex.terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Setting the derivative of this with respect to ˆ pt(z) equal to zero yields
ˆ pt(z) =
γ









ˆ θt + O(||ξ,γ||2). (15)
A.6 Comparison of Proﬁts
Next we would like to compare the proﬁts of a ﬁrm that is not able to make any time-inconsistent
commitments and a ﬁrm that is able to ﬁx its price for two periods. The expectation of the stream









t(z) − ˆ θtˆ pt(z) + (θ − 1)ˆ Stˆ pt(z)

+ ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Using equation (14) we can derive that, ignoring exogenous terms and terms of higher than second












+ var(ˆ St) +
1
(θ − 1)2var(ˆ θt)
#
.
30Similarly, using equation (15) we can derive that the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm that is able to ﬁx its
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(θ − 1)2var(ˆ θt)).
B Results when Firms have Private Information
We begin by deriving the function in our model that correponds to R(xt,µt,θt) in Athey et al.
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and consumer demand may be written
−θˆ pt(z) =
1
1 − γ − γβ
ˆ ct(z) −
γ
1 − γ − γβ
ˆ ct−1(z) −
γβ
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1 − γ − γβ
ˆ p2
t(z) + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Using consumer demand to eliminate the ﬁrst two terms in the expression for the value of the ﬁrm
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+ ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3).
Next we multiply through by (1 − γ − γβ)(1 − γ), use the demand curve to eliminate ˆ ct(z) and
focus only on terms that are aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s action at time t. This yields
R(Et−1ˆ pt(z), ˆ pt(z), ˆ St) = p(z)c(z)

γˆ pt(z) − γEt−1ˆ pt(z) −
1
2
(θ − 1)ˆ p2
t(z) − ˆ θtˆ pt(z) + (θ − 1)ˆ Stˆ pt(z)

+ex. terms + O(||ξ,γ||3). (16)
31This is the function in our model that corresponds to R(xt,µt,θt) in Athey et al. (2004). Mapping
our notation into the notation used by Athey et al. (2004) we get that: xt = Et−1ˆ pt(z), µt = ˆ pt(z)
and θt = ˆ St − ˆ θt/(1 − θ) ≡ Φt. In the notation used by Athey et al. (2004), the ﬁrm’s objective
function is




t + (θ − 1)θtµt.
Notice that this function satisﬁes all the conditions required for the propositions in Athey et
al. (2004) to be valid. Speciﬁcally, Rx(xt,µt,θt) = −γ < 0, Rµθ(xt,µt,θt) = θ − 1 > 0 and
Rµµ(xt,µt,θt) = −(θ − 1) < 0.
The main diﬀerence between our results and the results in Athey et al. (2004) is that they
consider a model in which R(xt,µt,θt) is the social welfare function, i.e. it is the objective of all the
agents in the model. The fact that R(xt,µt,θt) in Athey et al. (2004) is the social welfare function
entails that the resulting policy is socially optimal. Here we use the objective of the ﬁrm as our
R(xt,µt,θt), which means that the resulting policy is not socially optimal but rather the best policy
from the perspective of the ﬁrm. The proofs in Athey et al. (2004) do not rely on R(xt,µt,θt)
being a social welfare function. Only their interpretation as solving for the socially optimal policy
relies on this.
Given equation (16) and the following monotone hazard conditions: (1−P(ˆ Φt))/p(ˆ Φt) is strictly
decreasing in ˆ Φt and P(ˆ Φt)/p(ˆ Φt) is strictly increasing in ˆ Φt, Proposition 1 in Athey et al. (2004)
shows that the pricing policy that is optimal from the perspective of the ﬁrm is static. Here p(ˆ Φt)
and P(ˆ Φt) denote the pdf and cdf of ˆ Φt, respectively. We assume that ˆ Φt ∈ [ˆ Φ, ¯ ˆ Φ].
Furthermore, Proposition 2 in Athey et al. (2004) shows that the ﬁrm’s best pricing policy is





ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ;z) if ˆ Φ ∈ [ˆ Φ, ˆ Φ∗]
ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ∗;z) if ˆ Φ ∈ [ˆ Φ∗, ¯ ˆ Φ]
(17)
where ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ;z) denotes the static best response of a ﬁrm with a desired price equal to ˆ Φ and
ˆ Φ ≤ ˆ Φ∗ ≤ ¯ ˆ Φ.
To complete the description of the policy most prefered by the ﬁrm, we must calculate four
things: 1) Under what conditions does the ﬁrm prefer a constant price? 2) What is the optimal
constant price from the ﬁrm’s perspective? 3-4) When the ﬁrm prefers to set its price according
32to equation (17), what is the optimal cutoﬀ point ˆ Φ∗ and what is the ﬁrm’s static best response
ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ;z)?
The remainder of this section draws heavily on appendix D in Athey et al. (2004). First, notice
that the static best reponse of the ﬁrm solves Rˆ p(z)(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p(z), ˆ Φ) = 0. The solution is
ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ,z) =
γ
θ − 1
+ ˆ Φ. (18)




ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ,z)p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ +
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ∗,z)p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ.





Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
(ˆ Φ − ˆ Φ∗)p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ.
Athey et al. (2004) show that the objective of the ﬁrm,
R
R(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p(z), ˆ Φ)p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ may be written
R(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ,z), ˆ Φ) +
Z ˆ Φ∗
ˆ Φ
Rˆ Φ(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ,z), ˆ Φ)[1 − P(ˆ Φ)]dˆ Φ
+
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
Rˆ Φ(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p∗(ˆ Φ∗,z), ˆ Φ)[1 − P(ˆ Φ)]dˆ Φ.
Since Rˆ Φ(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p(z), ˆ Φ) = (θ − 1)ˆ p(z), this expression simpliﬁes to
γ
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
(ˆ Φ − ˆ Φ∗)p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ + (θ − 1)
Z ˆ Φ∗
ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ[1 − P(ˆ Φ)]dˆ Φ + (θ − 1)
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
ˆ Φ∗[1 − P(ˆ Φ)]dˆ Φ + ex. terms.
Diﬀerentiating this with respect to ˆ Φ∗ and setting the resulting expression equal to zero yields
−γ
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ + (θ − 1)
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
[1 − P(ˆ Φ)]dˆ Φ = 0,
which is equivalent to
−γ[1 − P(ˆ Φ∗)] + (θ − 1)
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
[1 − P(ˆ Φ)]dˆ Φ = 0.
When ˆ Φ∗ < ¯ ˆ Φ, 1 − P(ˆ Φ∗) > 0, so this last equation is equivalent to
−γ + (θ − 1)
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ∗
1 − P(ˆ Φ)
p(ˆ Φ)
p(ˆ Φ)
1 − P(ˆ Φ∗)
dˆ Φ = 0. (19)
Notice that the second term on the left hand side of this equaiton is the conditional mean of
(1 − P(ˆ Φ))/p(ˆ Φ) over the interval [ˆ Φ∗, ¯ ˆ Φ]. Since (1 − P(ˆ Φ))/p(ˆ Φ) is strictly decreasing in ˆ Φ∗
33(monotone hazard assumption), its conditional mean is also strictly decreasing in ˆ Φ∗. This implies
that equation (19) has at most one interior solution. Since the expression on the left hand side of
equation (19) is decreasing in both γ and ˆ Φ∗, it is furthermore the case that ˆ Φ∗ is decreasing in γ.
We have shown that equation (19) has at most one interior solutions. To show that such a
solution in fact exists we must show that the left hand side of this equation is negative for ˆ Φ∗ close
¯ ˆ Φ and positive for ˆ Φ∗ = ˆ Φ. Notice that when ˆ Φ∗ → ¯ ˆ Φ, (1−P(ˆ Φ))/p(ˆ Φ) → 0. This implies that for
γ > 0 and ˆ Φ∗ close enough to ¯ ˆ Φ, the left hand side of equation (19) is strictly less than zero. When
ˆ Φ∗ = ¯ ˆ Φ, equation (19) is not deﬁned. However, ˆ Φ∗ = ¯ ˆ Φ is a solution to the equation above equation
(19). However, since the expression on the left hand side of that equation is strictly negative for
ˆ Φ∗ < ¯ ˆ Φ in the neighborhood of ¯ ˆ Φ, this is not a local maximum.
Athey et al. (2004) show that at ˆ Φ∗ = ˆ Φ the left hand side of equation (19) becomes −γ − ˆ Φ.
Since ˆ Φ < 0, this is positive for γ ∈ (0,−ˆ Φ). So, there is an interior solution in this case. When
γ > −ˆ Φ there is no interior solution to equation (19). This implies that for this range of γ the
ﬁrm’s best policy is a constant price.
Finally, when γ > −ˆ Φ the ﬁrm chooses its constant price to maximize
Z ¯ ˆ Φ
ˆ Φ
R(Eˆ p(z), ˆ p(z), ˆ Φ)p(ˆ Φ)dˆ Φ
subject to Eˆ p(z) = ˆ p(z). The solution to this problem is ˆ p(z) = 0.
C The Sales Filter
Let pt denote the observed price at time t and rt denote the “regular” price at time t. The sales
ﬁlter has 6 steps for each time period which should be considered in order (i.e. step 1 has precedence
over step 2, etc.). However, for the ﬁrst time period, the algorithm implementing the ﬁlter should
start at step 3 (the ﬁrst step not to refer to rt−1). The steps of the ﬁlter are:
0. If pt = rt−1, then rt = rt−1.
1. If pt > rt−1, then rt = pt.
2. If rt−1 ∈ {pt+1,...,pt+J}, then rt = rt−1.
3. If the set {pt,pt+1,...,pt+L} has K or more diﬀerent elements, then rt = pt.
344. Deﬁne pmax = max{pt,pt+1,...,pt+L} and tmax = timemax{pt,pt+1,...,pt+L}. If pmax ∈
{ptmax,ptmax+1,...,ptmax+L}, then rt = pmax.
5. rt = pt.
The ﬁlter has three parameters to be chosen by its user: J and K. We chose these parameters to
be J = 8, K = 3, L = 3.
The ﬁlter identiﬁes sales as brief period of time when the price of the good drops below its
regular price before returning to its old regular price or a new reoccuring regular price. A simpler
ﬁlter would only identify sales as cases when the price returns to the original regular price. However,
our ﬁlter counts brief discounts followed by changes in the regular price as sales.
The parameters J, K and L determine how conservative the ﬁlter is at assigning price variation
to sales rather than variation in the regular price. If, e.g., J = K = L = 3 any price change lasting
longer than 3 periods is counted as a change in the regular price and any time 3 or more prices are
seen in four consecutive periods the ﬁlter assigns variation in the price to variation in the regular
price, not sales. This means that if two diﬀerent sales with diﬀerent sales prices happen with one
or two periods in between all the variation in price is assigned to the regular price. If J, K and L
are assigned higher values, longer and more irregular sales within a short period are allowed.
The parameters we use imply that the maximum duration of sales is 3 periods if the price
returns to the original “regular price” following a sale (i.e., a v-shaped sale) and 7 periods if the
price returns to a new recurring regular price following the sale.
Perhaps the best way to convince the reader that our sales ﬁlter correctly identiﬁes sales is
to show what happens when we apply the ﬁlter to a few price series. Figures 1-3 provide three
examples. In each ﬁgure we plot the price of a good and the regular price shifted up by $1. Two
things stand out: 1) Most of the time, the ﬁlter works very well. It ﬁlters out all sales and only
sales. 2) The ﬁlter is somewhat conservative in assigning price variation to sales rather than the
regular price. In particular, very irregular patterns of sales are attributed to variation in the regular
price rather than variation in the sale price. The most striking example of this is the price of Diet
Coke in the period form last 1995 to mid 1996. During this period, the price of Diet Coke varied
rather eratically and the sales ﬁlter was unable to identify a stable regular price. This type of error
tends to increase the frequency of price changes and the number of unique values in the regular
price series. Both of these eﬀects work against the results we present in section 6.
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39Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Retail Price Adjustment
Product Fraction of Weeks Fraction of Sales
at the that Return to the
Regular Price Regular Price
Analgesics 0.954 0.926
(0.001) (0.008)
Bath Soap 0.921 0.938
(0.003) (0.014)




Bottled Juices 0.831 0.956
(0.002) (0.003)
Canned Soup 0.892 0.957
(0.001) (0.003)












Dish Detergent 0.886 0.969
(0.002) (0.004)




Frozen Dinners 0.768 0.963
(0.004) (0.004)
Frozen Entrees 0.845 0.961
(0.001) (0.002)
Continued on next pageContinued from last page
Product Fraction of Weeks Fraction of Sales
at the that Return to the
Regular Price Regular Price
Frozen Juices 0.813 0.966
(0.002) (0.004)
Grooming Products 0.889 0.929
(0.001) (0.004)




Paper Towels 0.836 0.946
(0.004) (0.007)















Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. The total number of observations is 985,022.
The regular price and sale prices of a good are identiﬁed using the sales ﬁlter that is
discribed in appendix C. Estimates are based on pooled data from each category.Table 2: Adjustment of Regular versus Sale Prices
Frequency of Number of Unique Prices as a
Price Change Fraction of Total Weeks
Product Regular Prices Sale Prices Regular Prices Sales Prices
Analgesics 0.036 0.411 0.035 0.578
(0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.019)
Bath Soap 0.026 0.354 0.031 0.531
(0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.047)
Bathroom Tissues 0.110 0.491 0.064 0.359
(0.003) (0.014) (0.004) (0.029)
Beer 0.063 0.200 0.040 0.195
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.016)
Bottled Juices 0.084 0.454 0.053 0.404
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.014)
Canned Soup 0.058 0.418 0.042 0.464
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.016)
Canned Tuna 0.069 0.304 0.046 0.331
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.013)
Cereals 0.069 0.528 0.061 0.668
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.014)
Cheeses 0.111 0.530 0.080 0.395
(0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Cigarettes 0.036 — 0.053 0.580
(0.001) (0.001) (0.037)
Cookies 0.046 0.500 0.034 0.426
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009)
Crackers 0.065 0.445 0.044 0.349
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013)
Dish Detergent 0.054 0.453 0.047 0.434
(0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.018)
Fabric Softeners 0.057 0.404 0.045 0.495
(0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.023)
Front-end-Candies 0.028 0.344 0.024 0.338
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.016)
Frozen Dinners 0.066 0.551 0.040 0.432
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.022)
Frozen Entrees 0.054 0.495 0.039 0.446
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Continued on next pageContinued from last page
Frequency of Number of Unique Prices as a
Price Change Fraction of Total Weeks
Product Regular Prices Sale Prices Regular Prices Sales Prices
Frozen Juices 0.081 0.522 0.051 0.344
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011)
Grooming Products 0.034 0.497 0.036 0.442
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.011)
Laundry Detergents 0.061 0.425 0.049 0.538
(0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.027)
Oatmeal 0.071 0.530 0.062 0.607
(0.002) (0.019) (0.004) (0.029)
Paper Towels 0.086 0.482 0.045 0.301
(0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.023)
Refrigerated Juices 0.133 0.635 0.089 0.447
(0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.016)
Shampoos 0.043 0.443 0.038 0.443
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.013)
Snack Crackers 0.073 0.529 0.051 0.428
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.013)
Soaps 0.051 0.510 0.039 0.449
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.026)
Soft Drinks 0.076 0.652 0.042 0.309
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006)
Toothbrushes 0.049 0.406 0.045 0.403
(0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.016)
Toothpastes 0.056 0.492 0.048 0.443
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.013)
Median 0.061 0.487 0.045 0.434
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses. The total number of observations is 985,022.
The regular price and sale prices of a good are identiﬁed using the sales ﬁlter that is
described in appendix C. The frequency of price change is calculated by dividing the total
number of price changes by the total number of weeks. The statistics in columns three and
four are calculated by ﬁrst dividing the number of unique regular or sale prices observed for
a product by the total number of weeks at the regular price or on sale and then averaging
within categories.Table 3: Evidence of Price Commitments




Indian Steel Alliance steel organization represents 5 
leading steelmakers
5-Mar-04 Steelmakers in India will not increase prices of hot rolled steel coils until end of 
June even if input costs rise during this period, the chairman of an industry body 
(Indian Steel Alliance) said on Thursday
Tata Steel steel India 24-Aug-04 B Muthuraman, managing director, Tata Steel, said: “We will not increase prices 
for both our direct customers as well as retail customers till March 2005.” Tata 
Steel announcement assumed significance against the backdrop of rising global 
steel prices and large international steel companies like Arcelor and Posco 
already annoucing price hikes for the next quarter. 
Other   





29-Sep-98 announced it will not raise prices of its corn and soybean seed products in 
calendar year 1999, due to the "challenging economic conditions faced by US and 
Canadian farmers"
Sarel, brand of 
Schneider Electric
fences 1-Jun-01 Accompanying the catalogue is a new price list, the most important feature of 
which is what hasn't changed - the prices! In fact, Sarel, a brand of Schneider 
Electric, has had no price increases for more than five years, and no price 
changes are expected in the foreseeable future.
"Our new catalogue and stable prices both, in their own way, demonstrate our 
commitment to enclosure users," said Brian O'Donoghue, marketing manager.
"We have made a substantial investment in ensuring that our catalogue guides 
customers toward the most appropriate and most economical enclosure choices.
When they've made their choice, the exceptional stability of our prices means that 
they know not only that they're getting superb value for money today, but also that 
they will continue to do so in the future."Computer Related
Web Hosting
Tech trade Internet 
Services
web hosting 29-Jan-05 Price Freeze Guarantee.  Same price.  Forever.  
Infinity Hosting web hosting 29-Jan-05 Price Promise: the price you paid when you opened your account iw the price you 
will always pay.  No price increases no extra charges ever….No contract…cancel 
your hosting account…at any time
hostup.com web hosting 29-Jan-05 we will never, ever increase the pricing of hosting plans…you will always pay the 
same fee for your hosting account
A1-hosting web hosting 1-Dec-04 Life Time Price Guarantee…there will be no Price increases for the life of the time 
that you host with us
Cloch web hosting 1-Dec-04 Price Promise: Cloch Internet will not raise the price of your hosting plan, even if 
the price increases for new customers
BurningBulb.net web hosting 3-Dec-04 Price Freeze Guarantee.  Our clients take comfort in knowing that regardless of 
our future pricing policies, their monthly fee will always remain the same.  As our 
policies change for future accounts, current accounts continue to host at the same 




3-Dec-04 Price Freeze Guarantee…Choose one of our exclusive Price Freeze Guarantee 
subscriptions.  Clients who select this option will enjoy one low price for as long as 
they choose to keep the service.  Your Price will never go up! 
Optimum Online cable internet Nov-04 Cablevision Systems Corp. has announced that it will freeze prices for its 
Optimum Online high-speed Internet service in 2005. The announcement comes 
when the number of customers for that service has increased despite stepped-up 




30-Oct-04 "We want to assure all our customers that our prices remain frozen,"; states Paul 
Tourret, Managing Director of Comodo Limited,"We launched Instant SSL several 
months ago as the market leader in low-cost, fully validated, fully supported high 
quality SSL Certificates. The recent price increases from Thawte and GeoTrust 
only strengthen our unique position in this market - through Instant SSL we 
ensure that high quality SSL webserver security will remain affordable.";Power and 
Electricity
Electric Utilities
Powerco utility 4-Jan-02 Powerco, New Zealand’s third largest electricity and gas utility has implemented a 
12 month voluntary price freeze from 1 April 2002 for its electricity lines charges 
for all its residential consumers in the central and lower North Island. 
npower utility 29-Jan-05 With npower you’ll see no increase in your electricity and gas prices throughout 
the whole of 2005, providing there are no increases imposed by any 
governmental, statutory or licensing authority.
Bangor Hydro-Electric 
Company 
utility State of Maine utility 10-Jul-96 commitment not to raise prices
Oil and Gas
Bord Gais utility Bord Gáis Éireann (Bord 
Gáis) is a statutory body that 
was established under the 
1976 Gas Act. The company 
is responsible for the 
transmission, distribution and 
supply of natural gas in 
Ireland. Bord Gáis, which is 
wholly owned by the Irish 
Government, employs over 
800 staff and is 
headquartered at Gasworks 
Road, Cork.
29-Jun-00 Despite substantial increases in the supply cost of natural gas during the year, 
prices to consumers were not increased, in line with the company's commitment 
to maintain prices at existing levels until at least 2003. Natural gas prices for 
residential customers have not been increased since the mid-1980s.
Chinese Petroleum 
Corp
gas and oil Taiwan 1-Apr-04 "will not raise prices before May 20"
Petron Corporation diesel ? 2003 promised not to increase its prices any further for the rest of the year
Gazprom gas and oil Russia's oil and gas giant 3-Nov-99 Gazprom, Russia's oil and gas giant, does not intend to raise natural gas prices 
for its Russian clients this year, chairman of the company's board of directors 
Rem Vyakhirev said.
Other   ABB utility supplier ABB is a leader in power and 
automation technologies that 
enable utility and industry 
customers to improve 
performance while lowering 
environmental impact. The 
ABB Group of companies 
operates in around 100 
countries and employs 
around 105,000 people. 
25-May-04 In order to further strengthen our ties with our OEM customers, ABB will not be 
increasing prices on OEM medium voltage products.  We will maintain the current 





Jul-02 will not raise wholesale prices of HIV drugs until January 2004.  This will help low-
income people who are uninsured or underinsured and rely on state programs and 
federal funding for their medications
Pfizer pharmaceutic
al




Inspec is the leading English-
language bibliographic 
information service providing 
access to the world's 
scientific and technical 
literature in physics, electrical 
engineering, electronics, 
communications, control 
engineering, computers and 
computing, information 
technology, production, 
manfacturing and mechanical 
engineering.
2001 INSPEC is pleased to announce a price freeze for 2002.  This means no price 
increase for standalone customers and some networking customers will see a 
slight decrease.
Serials Solutions library 
services
Serials Solutions Inc. 
provides complete e-journal 
access services to over 1000 
libraries worldwide
19-Aug-03 Seattle, WA – August 19, 2003. Serials Solutions, Inc. announced today that it is 
freezing its 2003 price schedule and offering additional price breaks to keep 
services accessible for all libraries.Consumer Goods
DHA Lighting lighting 24-Jun-05 DHA Lighting has frozen prices on all products this year. The leading 
manufacturer of gobos, moving lighting effects, projection slides and creator of the 
Digital Light Curtain is holding its 2002 prices into 2003.
Marvel comic books 23-May-02 Marvel CEO Bill Jemas began today's press conference by swiping a line from 
Bush the Elder and declaring, "Read my lips, we will not raise prices."  The hastily 
called conference call with the comic press was arranged to provide a quick 
Marvel response to price increases on 20 books announced by DC Comics earlier 
in the week.  Though Jemas did note that many companies traditionally took 
advantage of price hikes by the competition to raise prices on their own goods, he 
promised "that unless something drastic happens to the contrary, we will hold 
price indefinitely."  
Jaguar auto 15/10/1998 Speaking today at the Sydney International Motor Show 1998 industry day, Mr 
Danny Rezek, managing director of Jaguar Australia, said that:"Since its inception 
in 1922, Jaguar Cars has espoused a philosophy of offering customers excellent 
value for money. Jaguar Australia's commitment to this philosophy is evident in 
our announcement today of a price freeze on all Jaguar models for the next six 
months. This price freeze is testimony to our serious commitment to ensure our 
customers continue to receive best-in-class value," said Mr Rezek.
Mitsubishi South Africa auto 23-Jun-05 Mitsubishi recently announced that it will not increase its prices for the remainder 
of 2001 and will only look at increasing prices in 2002.
Revlon consumer 
goods
9-Oct-00 Revlon Inc. (NYSE: REV) today announced an innovative change to the way it 
does business with its U.S. retail partners to drive market growth and emphasize 
mutual success.
In addition to the trade terms, the Company also announced a commitment not to 
raise prices for its retail partners in 2001.
Needham Junction ice 
cream
retail 5-May-04 In an article investigating the likelihood of future ice cream price increases:  
Around the middle of April…Turransky hiked the price of a small soft-serve ice 
cream cone...Turransky…stressed that he works with a printed menu, that he's 
already printed this season's and he won't be raising prices again
Apple Computer Inc ipod music 1-Dec-04 Apple Computer Inc. on Friday flatly denied a report that the computer maker was 
planning to raise prices for songs bought on its popular iTunes online music 
store... "These rumors aren't true," said Apple spokeswoman Natalie Sequeira. 
"We have multiyear agreements with the labels and our prices remain 99c a 
track."Consumer Services
Telephone
Illonois Bell Telephone 
Company
telephone 6/26/2004 Price protection which guarantees no price increases for the duration of the 12, 
24, or 36 month plan
Bell telephone 6/10/2004 SBC and other Bells have pledged not to increase wholesale prices until 2005
Citzens 
Communications co
telephone 6/23/1905 proposed agreement to purchase lines in rural Colorado: proposal included 
guarantee to "maintain current prices for at least a year"
Cell Phone
Cantel Amigo cell phone Canada cell phone 11/13/1997 price guarantee: We promise no price increases and the flexibility to change plans 
if you need to, no long term contract
Healthcare
Palmetto Health healthcare integrated healthcare delivery 
system
6/18/1996 Following merger, "guarantees that the new system will have no price increases 
for five years"
BUPA Ireland healthcare BUPA Ireland is part of 
BUPA, a global health and 
care organisation with 
members in over 190 
countries. BUPA have been 
committed to Irish healthcare 
for more than 15 years.BUPA 
Ireland is a not-for-profit 
organisation.
7/9/2002 will not be increasing prices to customers this year
Other (Small)
Color Express film 1/1/2005 Our published price list is one of our commitments. We provide consistent, "no 
surprises" pricing for our customers. 
Once we publish our price list, our track record proves that we commit to those 
prices; it's not uncommon to maintain prices for one to two years barring 
significant increases in the paper industry. Take a look at other published prices, 
and you will find revisions sometimes as frequently as every 3 - 6 months. Even if 
the competition's prices are "slashed", doesn't it make you wonder? 
Bravo Software software  Sep-02 This feature is called "Price Lock". Price Lock will allow you to purchase additional 
add-ons for the same price as when you joined the program. No price increases 
ever, for as long as you are a Customer Care member.Satin Ivy Laundry 
Service
laundry Jan-05 We offer a personalised service at affordable prices. Once accepted, our prices 
are set for 12 months – in fact we rarely increase prices even then, unless the 
purchase price of linen is increased.




1/1/2005 On the FAQ page:
Q. How often do you increase your prices?
A. I try to keep my rates as competitive as possible and rarely increase prices, 
this will depend mainly on the increase in the price of fuel and the general 
economy, over the last two years I have only increased my prices once by £1
University 
Procurement
Monash University procurement procurement of information 
technologies
Oct-04 The Universit requires that Suppliers provide a firm price period of at least twelve 
(12) months from the date of execution of a formal agreement…During the firm 
price period the Supplier guarantees not to increase prices….
Harvard University procurement office products procurement 
from Staples
1/1/2005 * Information based on an interview with the Harvard procurement manager: 
Staples prices fixed during the year for top 200(?) products 
 
The solid line is the price of Nabisco Premium Saltines. The dotted line is the regular 
price of Nabisco Premium Saltines shifted up by $1. 








Figure 1: Nabisco Premium Saltines 16oz 
The solid line is the price of Diet Coke 2L. The dotted line is the regular price of Diet 
Coke 2L shifted up by $1. 
 
 







Figure 2: Diet Coke 2L 
The solid line is the price of Nabisco Premium Saltines. The dotted line is the regular 
price of Nabisco Premium Saltines shifted up by $1. 











Figure 3: Kraft Singles 16oz